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Later this year, the European Commission has to submit a report to the Council of Ministers 
and the European Parliament with its views on tobacco tax policy in the EU. A 2004 
publication issued by the Commission expressed the beliefs that tobacco consumption should 
be controlled by increasing tobacco excises and that harmonization should proceed on the 
basis of specific rates. This article reviews and evaluates EU tobacco tax policies. It supports 
the move towards specific taxation, but notes that there are conceptual and empirical limits to 
excessively high tobacco taxes. Smokers appear to pay their way and cigarette smuggling is a 
growing menace to health and revenue objectives. 
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1 Introduction   
Smoking has been declared a deadly disease. According to a report with the 
telling title Tobacco or Health in the European Union, financed by and 
prepared for the European Commission (2004),
1 smoking is the single largest 
cause of avoidable death in the European Union (EU), killing 625.000 smokers 
each year (one in seven of all deaths) and involving gross costs estimated at 
between 1.04 and 1.39% of the EU’s GDP in 2000. As the backbone of a strong 
‘smoking intervention policy’, the report recommends that ‘[r]egular increases 
in tobacco taxes should be an implicit part of government efforts at EU and 
Member State level as these underpin other tobacco-control measures.’
2  
 
Next to the level, the structure of tobacco taxation is considered important. 
Should tobacco excises be levied at a fixed amount per quantity (specific rate), 
a fixed percentage of the product’s retail price (ad valorem rate), or some 
combination of these rates? Indeed, thus far, the appropriate balance between 
specific and ad valorem taxation has governed much of the debate on the 
harmonization of tobacco excises in the EU. Although the EU’s directives still 
have detailed rules regarding this balance, the 2004 report believes that 
‘[d]ifferences in tax rates should be harmonised on the basis of specific rates as 
opposed to ad valorem.’ 
 
In 2006, the European Commission will have to submit its next four-year report 
on tobacco taxation to the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.
3 
In anticipation of this report, this article reviews and evaluates current tobacco 
tax regimes in the EU. Section 2 lists the main elements of the agreed excise 
duty structure, called acquis communautaire, and highlights the diversity of 
cigarette tax rates and structures across the EU. Since the choice between 
specific and ad valorem taxation is a bone of contention, section 3 summarizes 
the theoretical findings on this issue. Subsequently, section 4 reviews the 
evidence on the question of whether smokers pay for the costs they impose on 
others. Next, section 5 dwells on revenue and tax rate issues, while section 6 
deals with bootlegging and smuggling. Section 7 summarizes the main tax 
policy points that emerge from the analysis. 
 
1 The report elaborates on an earlier joint study by the World Bank (WB) and the World Health Organization (WHO) (Jha and 
Chaloupka, 2000). In the WB/WHO study’s wake, the WHO promoted the worldwide adoption of a Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control, which was subsequently endorsed by all EU Member States. 
 
2 This and the quotation in the next paragraph are from p. 230 of the report. The other tobacco-control measures should 
include better and more widely publicized research into the consequences of smoking, comprehensive bans on the 
promotion and advertising of tobacco products, bans on specified tobacco outlets (internet sales and vending machines), 
universal smoke-free work and public places, and the development of cessation strategies. 
 
3 The last report was submitted in 2001 (European Commission, 2001). 
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2  Excise Duty Structures 
The current tobacco tax structures in the EU have evolved over 35 years in a 
series of political compromises and exigencies, with reforms often triggered by 
the prospective accession of new Member States. The latest Council directive 
(Council of the European Union, 2002) prescribes the following agreed tax 
measures: 
•  Member States impose a cigarette excise duty consisting of a specific and an 
ad valorem component. Effective July 1, 2006, the minimum total excise 
duty must be €64 per thousand cigarettes (€1.28 per pack of twenty). This 
requirement applies to all cigarettes. 
•  Furthermore, the minimum total level of excise taxation on the Most 
Popular Price Category (MPPC) of cigarettes in each Member State should 
be 57% of the tax-inclusive (excise plus VAT) retail sale price.
4 States are 
exempt from this requirement if the total excise duty on MPPC cigarettes is 
€101 or more per thousand cigarettes (€2.02 per pack of twenty).  
•  Member States can choose to set a minimum level of excise duty on all 
cigarettes at 100% of the level of the excises on the MPPC. 
•  There must be an element of both specific and ad valorem tax in the 
cigarette excise duty charged by Member States, with the specific element 
no less than 5% and no more than 55% of the total tax on the MPPC, 
including the VAT (which is identical in effect to the ad valorem excise 
duty). 
•  Sharply reduced rates – measured in terms of the price or weight of tobacco 
– apply to (a) fine-cut or rolling tobacco: 36% of the tax-inclusive retail 
price or €32 per kg; (b) cigars and cigarillos: 5% of the tax-inclusive retail 
price or €11 per 1000 items or per kg; and (c) other smoking tobacco: 20% 
of the tax-inclusive retail price or €20 per kg. There is no prescribed specific 
component for these tobacco products. 
•  All tobacco products are subject to the standard VAT rate, which should not 
be less than 15%.  
•  Intra-EU cross-border duty-paid shopping allowances are the following – 
cigarettes: 40 packs; cigars: 200 items; cigarillos: 400 items; and smoking 
tobacco: 1kg. 
•  In addition to these tax measures, the European Commission has issued 
rules regarding health warnings on tobacco packages, as well as restrictions 
on advertisements, sponsorships, and smoking in public places. 
 
The discussion in this article focuses mainly on cigarettes, which account for 
nearly 90% of total tobacco product sales. Figure 1 shows that the acquis 
communautaire for cigarettes permits a wide range of total tax levels (specific 
 
4 The brand of cigarettes that represents the MPPC in each Member State differs across Member States, depending on 
consumer tastes, market conditions, excise duty arrangements, and other factors. 
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and ad valorem excises plus VAT) and excise duty structures (specific vs. ad 
valorem taxes), as well as retail selling prices, throughout the EU.  
 
Figure 1 
Taxes on Cigarettes in the European Union 
 
Source: Table 1. Member States are ranked by decreasing amount of total tax per pack of cigarettes. Taxes have been 
calculated by reference to the retail sale price of the Most Popular Price Category (MPPC) of cigarettes in each Member 
State. 
 
In the ‘old’ Member States (EU-15; see Table 1), total taxes on MPPC 
cigarettes, at, on average, in excess of 300% of the pre-tax retail price, are the 
highest on any single product in the world; by comparison, the standard VAT 
rate is, on average, 19.8% in these states. Furthermore, while relative total tax 
burdens of, on average, 75% of the retail price do not vary greatly between 
most Member States, there are substantial differences in the absolute amounts 
of total tax burdens and retail prices of MPPC cigarettes. The UK, for example, 
levies €5.88 tax per pack of 20 cigarettes (of which €3.01 is from the specific 
rate), but Spain only €1.76 (of which €0.16 is from the specific rate). Not 
surprisingly, retail prices are €7.43 and €2.25 per pack, respectively – a 
difference of €5.18 per pack or €0.26 per stick. Clearly, harmonization still has 
some way to go. 
 
All old EU Member States meet the minimum total excise requirement of €64 
per thousand cigarettes. In Denmark and Sweden, the total excise duty is less 
than 57% of the retail selling price, but then the overall excise burden in these 
countries is more than €101, which supersedes the 57% requirement. Of the 
‘new’ Member States (EU-10; see Table1), Cyprus and Malta comply with the 
































































retail price minus tax specific element in tax total tax minus specific elementTable 1 
Statistics on Smoking in the European Union 




























as % of 
domestic 
sales 
EU-15  3.99  3.03  27 277 117 33 - 24  .
UK  7.43  5.88  52 192 44 26 - 24  na
Ireland  6.35  4.93  54 333 66 28 - 26  4
France  5.00  4.02  7 238 47 36 - 25  2
Germany  4.47  3.40  49 204 89 37 - 28  10
Denmark  4.15  3.10  55 242 77 30 - 24  na
Finland  4.10  3.09  10 148 48 26 - 19  na
Sweden  4.30  2.97  14 125 40 16 - 19  2
Netherlands  3.68  2.69  50 160 47 33 - 27  8
Belgium  3.56  2.67  5 200 68 33 - 22  7
Austria  3.10  2.34  21 208 89 32 - 26  15
Italy  3.10  2.33  5 191 84 31 - 17  12
Portugal  2.75  2.16  49 129 89 31 - 15  na
Greece  2.80  2.06  5 254 157 51 - 39  8
Luxembourg  2.88  2.02  14 1353 707 39 - 26  7
Spain  2.25  1.76  9 175 109 39 - 25  15
      
EU-10  1.73  1.25  36 95 82 40 - 20  .
Malta  3.26  2.51  14 207 74 30 - 21  na
Cyprus  2.88  2.08  20 192 87 39 -   8  na
Slovenia  1.88  1.39  20 155 115 28 - 20  na
Hungary  1.76  1.32  42 95 76 42 - 29  5
Slovak Rep  1.80  1.27  45 52 42 48 - 32  3
Poland  1.49  1.12  34 48 79 39 - 23  15
Czech Rep  1.49  1.00  41 88 110 38 - 23  7
Estonia  1.25  0.87  40 60 82 45 - 18  16
Lithuania  0.90  0.55  50 24 43 44 - 12  30
Latvia  0.63  0.41  53 27 114 49 - 13  39
      
EU averages  3.09  2.32  30 204 103 36 - 22  .
Sources: 
-Retail prices, tax rates, and specific elements (2006): European Commission (2006). 
-Consumption and tax revenues (2004): industry sources and own calculations. 
-Percentage smokers (2002–03): www.ash.org.uk (6 January 2006). 
-Smuggling (1995): table 15.3 in Merriman et al. (2000). 
 
Notes: 
a EU-15 and EU-10 are each ranked by decreasing amount of total tax per pack of 20 
cigarettes.  
b MPPC is Most Popular Price Category of cigarettes in each Member State on which 
basis the total tax has been calculated.states do not; they will have to increase current excise duty levels on cigarettes 
by between 18% (Slovenia) and 310% (Latvia) to do so. 
 
The preference for a predominantly specific or ad valorem duty is about evenly 
divided among Member States. When both rates are expressed as percentages of 
the VAT-exclusive retail price, 12 mainly northern tobacco-importing Member 
States have a predominantly specific excise duty structure while 13 mainly 
southern tobacco-growing Member States have a preference for the ad valorem 
excise duty. Notable exceptions to the north–south contrast are Belgium, 
Finland, Luxembourg, and Sweden, where the ad valorem rate is higher than 
the specific rate, and Portugal, where the specific rate dominates the ad valorem 
rate. 
3 Specific  vs.  Ad Valorem Rates 
What is the appropriate balance between specific and ad valorem taxation?
5 In 
practice, the balance is not dictated by theoretical considerations about product 
quality, external costs, or revenue, but mainly by protectionist sentiments. The 
home-grown tobaccos of the southern Member States are cheaper than the 
higher-quality American blends that the northern Member States import for 
their consumers, as reflected in the differences in retail prices minus taxes (in 
other words, production and distribution costs) in Figure 1: the pre-tax price 
ranges from €0.22 (Latvia) to €1.55 (UK) per pack, and from 20% (France) to 
39% (Lithuania) of the retail price. Since a specific rate tends to shrink relative 
price differences between low-cost and high-cost brands, whereas an ad 
valorem regime does not, the latter is more propitious to southern European 
producers, mainly Italy and Greece.
6 
  
Since the European Commission has expressed an interest in giving more 
weight to the specific rate, it may be instructive to review briefly the theoretical 
arguments regarding the choice between specific and ad valorem taxation.
7 In a 
perfectly competitive market for a homogeneous good, the choice is irrelevant: 
any specific tax could be replaced by its percentage equivalent with no effect on 
consumer and producer prices or on government revenue.  
 
 
5 For a review of the theoretical arguments, see especially Keen (1998). The conflict over the appropriate rate structure is 
reflected in the tobacco tax rate structures of the various Member States as well as the acquis communautaire: the 57% 
requirement favors harmonization on the basis of the ad valorem rate, but the €64/1000 sticks minimum excise burden 
favors harmonization on the basis of the specific rate. 
 
6 Tobacco is also the most heavily subsidized crop per hectare under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The EU 
spends nearly €1 billion annually on tobacco subsidies – 2.3% of the CAP budget and 1.1% of the Commission budget. The 
EU has decided to phase out the production subsidies by 2010 and replace them by lump-sum payments and subsidies to 
finance restructuring programs. See European Commission (2004). 
 
7 
This and the next section are adapted from Cnossen and Smart (2005). 
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In an imperfectly competitive market, however, quality levels between similar 
excisable products, such as cigarettes, differ widely: someone who smokes 
knows that there are large differences in quality between a Virginia and two 
sticks of sawdust. In such a market, a common specific tax rate reduces relative 
price differences between low-quality and high-quality brands, while a common 
ad valorem rate does not. Standard optimal tax considerations would therefore 
seem to argue for ad valorem taxation – relative prices would be unchanged, 




These arguments apply to competitive markets in which the set of quality levels 
on offer is given exogenously. With imperfect competition, however, firms’ 
incentives to raise price and to distort quality may be quite different under 
specific and ad valorem taxation. In the case of a monopolist, for example, 
specific taxation increases marginal costs by a fixed amount, whereas ad 
valorem taxation acts as a proportional tax on costs, together with a 
proportional (lump-sum) tax on monopoly profits. By taxing marginal revenue, 
ad valorem taxation, ta, increases the firm’s perceived demand elasticity by the 
multiplier 1/(1–ta) and so diminishes incentives for the firm to raise price above 
marginal cost. Thus one might expect consumer prices to be lower under ad 
valorem than under specific taxation. Indeed, it is possible to show, in the 
monopoly case, that replacing a specific tax, ts, by its ad valorem equivalent, 
ta=ts/p, causes consumer prices to fall and tax revenue and monopoly profits to 
rise (Skeath and Trandel, 1994). So everyone gains from ad valorem taxation – 
except the public health advocate.
9  
 
Just as ad valorem taxation seems to induce firms to cut prices, it also creates a 
clear incentive to downgrade product quality (Barzel, 1976), because the 
multiplier effect of ad valorem taxation makes improvements in product quality 
more expensive for the firm. The cost of carbon filters, for example, which 
purify the tobacco of tar and other harmful substances, is subject to the 
multiplier effect. Likewise, ad valorem taxation reduces incentives to invest in 
advertising, promotion, and other demand-enhancing fixed costs of production. 
 
8 Of course, the tax would still have income effects that might induce consumers to choose lower-quality brands, but so 
would a non-distortionary lump-sum tax. The theory of optimal taxation implies that a uniform percentage tax on a subset of 
commodities is desirable only under restrictive conditions on preferences (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980), but in this context 
those restrictions seem plausible. 
 
9 In the Cournot model of an oligopoly industry, the story is largely the same: a shift to ad valorem taxation will reduce prices 
and increase government revenues. In this case, however, industry profits may fall, as competition among firms intensifies. 
A further, testable, implication of the theory is that the pass-through of tax increases to consumer prices should be greater 
under specific than under ad valorem taxation (Delipalla and Keen, 1992). Indeed, there is some evidence that specific taxes 
in the EU are more likely to be ‘over-shifted’ (consumer prices rise by more than the tax) than ad valorem taxes (Delipalla 
and O’Donnell, 2001). 
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In contrast, specific taxation does not directly distort manufacturers’ decisions 
to invest in product quality.
10  
 
In short, the choice between specific and ad valorem taxation depends on 
whether the primary aim of the policy is to discourage consumption or to raise 
revenue and on whether improvements in product quality are deemed desirable 
or not. Furthermore, if the goal of policy is to reduce consumption, there is 
some tension between the tendency of specific taxes to lead to higher consumer 
prices and the tendency of ad valorem taxes to discourage investments in 
quality that keep consumers ‘hooked’. (On the other hand, if the goal is to 
reduce consumption damage, ad valorem rates have the drawback that they 
discourage expensive filters.) On balance, the solution is likely to be ad 
valorem taxation at a higher equivalent rate to achieve the desired level of 
consumer prices, and with concomitant gains for government treasuries. 
 
The Pigouvian perspective leads to a very different conclusion, however – the 
damage caused by smoking is, at any point in time, independent of the price at 
which cigarettes are sold, so that correction of externalities favors specific over 
ad valorem taxation.
11 Furthermore, other, more immediate, considerations 
might govern the choice of tax structure. Thus, a specific tax can be imposed at 
the manufacturer’s or importer’s stage where it is easiest to collect, whereas, 
under a system of free trade prices, an ad valorem levy must be collected at the 
retail stage if trade distortions and tax avoidance are to be avoided. In the EU, 
of course, most Member States circumvent this issue by determining the ad 
valorem excise by reference to agreed retail prices, making the excise a specific 
tax as long as cigarette producers do not negotiate new retail prices with the 
excise tax authorities.
12  
4  Do Smokers Pay Their Way? 
In recent years, the controversy about specific vs. ad valorem taxation has 
largely been overtaken by a heated debate about the costs that smokers impose 
on society. Smoking is a primary cause of lung cancer, emphysema, and 
chronic bronchitis, and a major cause of heart disease and stroke. The economic 
costs – related primarily to the expense of treating smoking-related illnesses, as 
well as the well-being and market earnings that are lost as a consequence of 
 
10 However, specific taxation may induce consumers to opt for higher-quality brands, if the degree of tax shifting is 
independent of product quality. In support of this view, Sobel and Garrett (1997) find that specific tax increases in US states 
are associated with significant declines in the market share of generic brands. 
 
11 An economic counter-argument is that the share of specific in total taxation should be smaller when the marginal cost of 
public funds is higher and the importance of excise duties for generating revenue correspondingly greater. To some extent, 
this reasoning is consistent with the ad valorem excise element in EU tobacco tax structures. 
 
12 An incidental, if welcome, side effect of this practice is that it weakens the argument that the value of a specific excise 
erodes with inflation. After all, inflation would compel producers to approach the excise authorities with a proposal for a new 
retail price.  
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smoking-related illnesses and death – are relevant to public policy if external, 
i.e. imposed on others, rather than internal, i.e. borne privately by the smoker 
(e.g. through higher health insurance contributions).
13 Along with information 
failures, i.e. lack of knowledge about addiction and health risks, the external 
costs establish a case for government intervention through taxation, as well as, 
or instead of, through regulation and education.  
 
Various researchers have attempted to provide empirical estimates of the gross 
(public and private) external costs of smoking. The essence of the most 
common approach is to use healthcare utilization rates to forecast the 
incremental health expenditures for the current generation of smokers, make 
some additions for the healthcare costs associated with environmental or 
‘second-hand’ tobacco smoke,
14 and then divide the total amount by the number 
of packs of cigarettes currently consumed, to arrive at an estimate of the 
(average) Pigouvian tax rate. Since the externalities from tobacco consumption 
may well be almost constant across each unit consumed, the average tax rate 
should closely approximate the marginal tax rate.  
 
On the basis of a careful review of a large number of studies, Lightwood et al. 
(2000) conclude that estimates of gross external costs range from 0.1 to 1.1% of 
GDP in high-income countries. The higher estimates are found in countries 
where healthcare costs account for a relatively large share of GDP. As regards 
EU Member States, research in the UK for 1985–86 estimated gross costs at 
between 0.08 and 0.13% of GDP (Maynard et al., 1987), while gross costs in 
Finland for 1995 were estimated at 0.17% of GDP (Pekurinen, 1999).  
 
Smokers tend to live shorter lives than non-smokers, however, which saves on 
pension payments and healthcare costs of age-related diseases.
15 From an 
economic point of view, therefore, it is net costs, which assess all government 
social security expenditures over a lifetime, that should be the focus of 
analysis.
16 Although Lightwood et al. (2000) conclude that the majority of the 
 
13 The distinction between public and private healthcare expenditures seems irrelevant if private health insurers do not 
successfully control moral hazard by smoking clients. In this case, virtually all smoking-related healthcare expenditures are 
properly classified as external costs that should be internalized through Pigouvian taxation.  
 
14 Viscusi (2002) indicates that the evidence on the potential health risks of second-hand smoke is not as compelling as the 
evidence on risks of primary tobacco smoke, which are among the most well-established health risks. It is also argued that 
much second-hand smoke is experienced within the family home. Accordingly, such costs should be internalized by the 
smoker, either through altruism or through explicit negotiations among family members (Manning et al., 1989). This is not 
entirely plausible, however, if the family members are very young or still unborn.  
 
15 Obviously, this does not mean that death is an economically desirable event. Rather, as Warner et al. (1995) point out, it 
simply means that as long as early death reduces the extra social costs in the form of social benefits and pensions, smokers 
should receive a ‘credit’ for the associated savings.  
 
16 It is sometimes argued that the output, income, and employment generated by the tobacco industry must be viewed as 
benefits to the community at large, but this proposition rests on the highly unlikely assumptions that, in the absence of 
smoking, the money spent on cigarettes would not be spent on other products and that the resources used in producing 
cigarettes would have no alternative uses. This having been said, short-run adjustment costs from industry downsizing 
would arise, of course.   10 
cross-section studies reviewed by them indicate that the net costs of smoking 
are small but positive, there are notable exceptions in the literature. For the 
Netherlands, for instance, Barendregt et al. (1997) calculated the length of time 
it takes for the cost savings from smoking to be balanced by the increased costs 
from the longer life expectancies of non-smokers. Their results imply that 
smoking reduces net healthcare costs (using a discount rate of up to 5%). 
Similarly, a study for Finland (Pekurinen, 1992) concluded that smoking could 
involve net healthcare cost savings (using a 4% discount rate).
17  
 
This evidence is striking, because it means that government measures to reduce 
smoking through higher taxes would seem to be a form of paternalism on which 
economics has little to say. After all, the principle of consumer sovereignty 
implies that a rational person who weighs up all the costs and benefits of his 
actions should be free to smoke as long as he is fully informed about the 
consequences of his choice and does not impose costs on others. Admittedly, as 
has been pointed out, the rationality condition ceases to apply if smokers are ill-
informed about the consequences of smoking, act myopically in choosing to 
consume an addictive drug (Peck et al., 2000), or behave in a dynamically 
inconsistent fashion (Gruber and Koszegi, 2001) by discounting costs and 
benefits in the near-term future to a greater extent than those in the long term.
18  
 
In the main, however, the rationality hypothesis is the cornerstone of economic 
analysis. Accordingly, on economic grounds, the role of taxation in curtailing 
tobacco use at current levels of excise duties and VATs does not seem very 
strong in the EU, because smokers seem to pay their way and probably more 
than that. This economic conclusion, of course, may not satisfy public health 
advocates who believe that less smoking is always better. But this position rests 
on the questionable assumption that governments know what is best for people. 
On balance, the line should probably be drawn at providing information on the 
                                                                                                                                                          
 
17 In a very thorough and influential study for the US, Manning et al. (1989) conclude that the net costs of smoking are 
US$0.15 per pack and the gross costs US$0.42 (future costs discounted at 5%). The net costs rise to US$0.38 if all lives 
lost to passive smoking and smoking-related fires are treated as external costs rather than assumed to be in the family and 
taken into account by the smoker. The last amount approximately equals the sum of the state and federal excise and sales 
taxes of US$0.37 per pack. Accordingly, the authors conclude that smokers probably pay their way. In an updated version of 
the Manning et al. study, Viscusi (1995) found that total taxes on cigarettes exceeded the net external costs of smoking in 
the US, because the financial savings from premature mortality in terms of lower nursing-home costs and retirement 
pensions exceeded the higher medical care and life insurance costs generated. The results of these studies, however, are 
sensitive to the choice of the discount rate at which the net present value of future costs is estimated. At 0% and 10% 
discount rates, the net external costs in the Manning et al. study are US$0.91 and US$0.24 per pack, respectively. 
 
18 In support of this view, Gruber and Mullainathan (2005) provide evidence that higher cigarette taxes increase smokers’ 
self-reported happiness.  
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consequences of smoking, banning smoking in public places, and discouraging 
smoking by the young.
19  
5  Revenue and Tax Rate Issues 
Taxation of cigarettes (and other tobacco products) generates widely varying 
amounts of tax revenue in different Member States, largely (although not 
entirely) attributable to differences in the level of taxation. Table 1 indicates 
that tobacco taxes range from €24 per capita in Lithuania to €333 in Ireland and 
€1353 in Luxembourg, which snatches a considerable part of the tax base of its 
neighboring Member States (see below). These figures include the VAT, which 
is imposed on the excises as well as on the cost of tobacco products.
20 On 
average, the old Member States collect considerably more on a per-capita basis 
than the new Member States, with the exception of the small island economies, 
Malta and Cyprus, and Slovenia. Obviously, per-capita tax revenue is also 
correlated with per-capita consumption. As the table shows, a greater 
percentage of men than women smoke, except in emancipated Sweden, and on 
average the percentage of male smokers is higher in new Member States than in 
old states.  
 
A standard economic justification for the imposition of high tobacco taxes is 
that they minimize the efficiency costs of raising a given amount of revenue, 
because the elasticity of demand for cigarettes is low. What evidence is there 
that this ‘inverse elasticity’ rule indicates above-average taxes on tobacco? 
Viscusi (1992, 2002) provides a review of 41 studies on the effect of cigarette 
prices on the demand for cigarettes. Thirty-one of these studies are for the US, 
for which the estimated elasticities of demand are clustered in the range–0.4 to 
–1.0. Nine of the studies are for the UK, where the estimated elasticity range is 
from –0.1 to –0.8, but most studies yield estimates around –0.5 or –0.6. As 
expected, the long-run elasticity is higher than the short-run elasticity and 
young people are more price-responsive than older smokers. Viscusi (2006) 
points out that the tobacco price elasticity is not unlike similar estimates for 
stationery, legal services, automobile repairs, and newspapers and magazines, 
as well as a wide variety of food products, ranging from chickens to bananas. 
On balance, therefore, the price elasticity of tobacco demand is not so low that 




19 For a cogent defense of a liberal yet compassionate attitude, see The Economist (1996). It should also be pointed out that 
the non-fiscal control measures have a regulatory effect with a ‘tax-equivalent’ value, which should, broadly speaking, be 
deducted from the Pigouvian tax that would be indicated in the absence of the regulatory policies.  
 
20 It is often argued that the VAT should be left out of consideration, because its imposition would not affect the price of 
tobacco relative to other consumer goods. This would be correct if the excises reflected the social cost of tobacco use, but to 
the extent that this is not the case, the VAT on the amount of the excises over the social cost represents an additional tax. If 
the social costs of smoking were negligible (see above), the effective VAT rate, expressed as a percentage of pre-tax price, 
would be 54% instead of 15% (assuming that the excises amounted to 57% of the tax-inclusive retail price).   12 
As regards the structure of the excise duties across different tobacco products, 
there is considerable substitution away from high-taxed cigarettes towards low-
taxed roll-your-own (fine-cut) tobacco. Over the period 2002–04, the weighted 
average quantity of cigarettes released for consumption decreased by 10%, 
while the quantity of roll-your-own tobacco (which accounts for some one-tenth 
of tobacco product sales) increased by 20%.
21 Cigarettes contain some 0.75 
grams of tobacco. Allowing for cost differences, presumably roll-your-own 
tobacco should be taxed at two-thirds of the €64/1000 sticks excise duty level 
on cigarettes or at €57 per kg, three-fourths higher than the current agreed 
minimum rate of €32 per kg.  
 
Another issue concerns the prescribed calculation of the tax burden by reference 
to the MPPC concept. This concept, necessitated by the use of high ad valorem 
excise duties on cigarettes, appears ill-defined and subject to manipulation 
(Oxford Economic Forecasting, 2004). Administrative problems and 
uncertainty arise, because the MPPC can be taken from any time period in the 
two years prior to the date that the tax is calculated, while the MPPC category 
can represent as little as 14% of total market volume. When the market leader 
in any Member State raises its MPPC price, this may force tax and price 
increases of competitive brands – an abuse of dominant position, arguably in 
violation of Article 82 of the EU Treaty.  
 
Similarly, the 57% criterion has perverse effects below the €101 level. A 
Member State with a volatile cigarette market where the MPPC changes from 
the top of the price range to the bottom can be conforming to the minimum 
excise one day and be in breach of the acquis communautaire the next, without 
having made any change to its tax rates and with virtually no change in the 
market situation. Adoption of a single specific rate eventually would obviate the 
need for the anachronistic MPPC concept and the 57% criterion. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that tobacco taxes are highly discriminatory and 
regressive, more so than any other tax. In the EU, only 36% of men and 22% of 
women pay tobacco taxes (see Table 1). Regressivity should not be an issue if 
tobacco taxes serve as a proxy for social costs that should be reflected in the 
price of cigarettes: the poor, just like the rich, should pay for the costs they 
impose on others. But if the social cost argument does not cut much ice (see 
above), then regressivity is an issue that should be taken into consideration. 
Proportionately, the poor spend a higher share of their income on cigarettes 
than the rich, assuming that the prevalence of smoking is the same. As a group, 
however, the poor smoke more than the rich, which tends to exacerbate the 
regressivity problem across income classes. In fact, smoking is becoming 
increasingly concentrated in lower classes – variously defined by income, 
education, occupation, or social class. While the poor were the last to pick up 
smoking, they are also the last to quit. (See Bobak et al. (2000).) 
 
 
21 Although fine-cut tobacco sales account on average for a small percentage of the total tobacco market, in some Member 
States, e.g. Belgium and the Netherlands, their share is relatively high. In turn, this means that per-capita consumption 
figures in Table 1 are lower than they otherwise would be.    13 
 
6  Bootlegging and Smuggling 
Furthermore, there are worrisome tobacco tax enforcement problems in the EU. 
The high levels of tobacco taxation in most Member States, as well as the large 
differences between them (along with the very large increases in international 
trade and passenger movements), have become fertile breeding grounds for 
bootlegging (the purchase of duty-paid tobacco products in excess of cross-
border shopping allowances in low-tax states for consumption in high-tax 
states) and smuggling (the purchase and consumption of tobacco products on 
which no duty has been paid).  
 
Luxembourg is a prime example of a major bootlegging country due to the 
much higher total tax rates on tobacco products in neighboring states. If annual 
consumption per adult in Luxembourg were the same as average consumption 
in Belgium, France, and Germany (see Table 1), then only 10% of cigarettes 
bought in the duchy would be consumed there. Bootlegging is also a problem 
between Poland and Germany (the price differential is €2.98; see Table 1), 
Finland and Estonia (€2.85), and Greece and Bulgaria (€1.56) (Joossens and 
Raw, 2000). Bootlegging of roll-your-own tobacco is a serious problem for the 
UK which has a high specific excise of €157.61 per kg compared with Belgium 
which levies only a moderate ad valorem excise of 37.55%. Only three out of 
every 10 packets of hand-rolling tobacco consumed in the UK are duty-paid 
(House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2005), in spite of a sizable increase 
in the cross-border shopping allowance from 1kg to 3kg.  
 
The most serious problem facing EU Member States, however, is not 
bootlegging but large-scale organized smuggling of tobacco products on which 
no duty has been paid at all. As Table 1 indicates, cigarette smuggling, as a 
percentage of domestic sales, has moved into double figures in Poland and the 
Baltic States as well as in Austria, Spain, Italy, and Germany.
22 In 2004, HM 
Customs and Excise (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2005) estimated 
that the share of illicit cigarettes in the domestic market of the UK was some 
15%, two-thirds of which was accounted for by smuggling. Many illegal 
shipments originate in China (the world’s largest producer of counterfeit 
cigarettes), where cigarettes are not controlled regarding carcinogens (arsenic, 
cadmium, lead) and hazardous remnants of pesticides or excessive levels of tar 
and nicotine.  
 
22 Cnossen and Smart (2005) estimate the population-weighted average of smuggled cigarettes as a percentage of EU 
consumption in 1995 at about 8.9%. It is highly likely that this figure has to be revised upwards due to the enormous growth 
in trade and passenger movements since 1995. In the press, sharply higher figures than shown in Table 1 have been 
reported for Finland, France, Germany, and Hungary.   14 
7  Implications for Tobacco Tax Policy 
The main conclusion of this review of tobacco taxation in the EU is that the 
externality argument seems to be less persuasive than appears to be the case at 
first sight. Also, above-average taxation of tobacco on inverse elasticity 
grounds is difficult to defend. Furthermore, smuggling, by organized crime, is a 
serious problem. In short, there are conceptual and empirical limits to 
excessively high levels of tobacco taxation.  
 
The main issues can be summed up as follows: 
 
•  Apparently, the European Commission favors a ‘smoking intervention 
policy’ rather than an economic approach that has regard to net social costs 
and distributional concerns. This view seems defensible if market 
imperfections, such as information failures, are involved, but smells of 
paternalism with regard to rational tobacco consumers. The problem of 
environmental tobacco smoke can best be tackled by a ban on smoking in 
public places. 
•  The Commission recommends higher taxes on tobacco, even though the tax 
burden on cigarettes, at 300% of the pre-tax retail price, is already the 
highest on any single product in the world. Clearly, the high tax burden 
promotes smuggling, which in turn undermines health policies and revenue. 
Although the case for increasing cigarette excises further is weak, an 
argument can be made for aligning the excise duties on other tobacco 
products with those on cigarettes. 
•  The harmonization of tobacco duties, promoted by the Commission, would 
reduce bootlegging (not smuggling), but violates the subsidiarity principle. 
Interestingly, harmonization is not pursued in the US (or in other federal 
countries), where cigarette taxes range from US$0.86 in Virginia to 
US$2.48 in New Jersey (Cnossen and Smart, 2005).  
•  In a break with the policy pursued thus far, a report published by the 
Commission now favors specific over ad valorem excise rates as the best 
means to promote its smoking intervention policy and tax harmonization 
goals. Specific rates would not require agreement between governments and 
producers on prescribed retail prices, which violate the free market principle 
and which are susceptible to manipulation. This would obviate the need for 
the MPPC concept and the 57% criterion. Interestingly, ad valorem excise 
duties are not applied in the US or other non-EU industrialized countries. A 
drawback of specific rates is that their yield does not increase with rises in 
the consumer price index; accordingly, automatic adjustment should be 
provided for by law. 
 
In conclusion, the European Commission seems well-advised to pursue specific 
tobacco taxation and to confine the ad valorem element to the VAT. Rate 
increases beyond the current level of €64/1000 sticks appear inadvisable if the 
baby is not to be thrown away with the bath water. Perhaps the new Member 
States should be granted longer adjustment periods. Further harmonization does   15 
 
not sit well with subsidiarity, although it would mitigate the bootlegging 
problem.  
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